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Section 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1881,1 provides
that either party may propound interrogatories, to be filed with
the pleadings, relevant to the matter in controversy, and require
the opposite party to answer the same under oath.
That remedial process of discovery by interrogatories and the
legislation governing the production and inspection of writings
and the oral examination under oath of an adverse party are
statutory regulations of and substitutes for the remedial process
of equity jurisprudence known as a bill of discovery under oath
in aid of an action at law or a suit in equity or the defense
thereof.
Article 17 of the Indiana Constitution2 provides that the con-
stitution, if adopted, shall take effect on the first day of Novem-
ber, 1851.
Section 20 of Article 7 of the Indiana Constitution3 provides
that the General Assembly at its first session after the adoption
of the constitution shall provide for the appointment of three
commissioners, whose duty it shall be to revise, simplify and
abridge the rules, practice, pleadings and forms of the courts
of justice. And they shall provide for abolishing the distinct
forms of action at law now in use and that-justice shall be ad-
ministered in a uniform mode of pleading, without distinction
between law and equity.
The constitution did not require that any of the remedial
processes of equity jurisprudence be abolished, but it did re-
quire that the distinct forms of actions at law then in use be
abolished and that justice be administered in a uniform mode
of pleading, without distinction between law and equity. The
purpose was to do away with the distinct forms of actions at
law because of their inflexibility and to preserve and follow the
practices of equity because of their flexibility. There was no
intent to curtail equity processes, but the intent was to make
equity processes available at law.
* See p. 544 for biographical note.
'Acts 1881, page 240, now Burns 1926, Sec. 383.
2 Now Burns 1926, Sec. 242.
3 Now Burns 1926, Sec. 187.
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The act approved June 18, 1852,4 was entitled,
"An act to revise, simplify and abridge the rules, practice, pleadings
and forms in civil cases in the courts of this state-to abolish distinct forms
of actions at law and to provide for the administration of justice in a
uniform mode of pleading and practice, without distinction between law
and equity."
Section 1 of that act of 1852 abolished the distinction be-
tween actions at law and suits in equity and the forms of all
such actions and suits theretofore existing and provided that
thereafter there shall be but one form of action for the enforce-
ment or protection of private rights and the redress of private
wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action. The act con-
sisted of 803 separate sections and the General Assembly, by
that act, attempted to provide a complete code of civil procedure.
The act approved April 7, 1881, 5 consisted of 867 separate
sections and the General Assembly, by that act, attempted to
provide a complete code of civil procedure. The act of 1881
superseded the act of 1852, re-enacting most of its provisions,
and is the basis of our present code of civil procedure.
Section 294 of the code of civil procedure of 1852 provided
that no action to obtain discovery under oath, in aid of the
prosecution or defense of another action, shall be allowed, except
in the manner prescribed by that chapter.
Discovery under oath in aid of an action at law or the defense
thereof or in aid of a suit in equity or the defense thereof was
a much favored remedy of equity jurisprudehce.
A bill of discovery was a proceeding for the discovery of
facts resting in the knowledge of the adverse party, seeking no
relief in consequence of the discovery, but seeking the discovery
in aid of some other proceeding either at law or in equity
already pending or about to be brought, in aid of which the
discovery was necessary.
A bill of discovery and for relief was a proceeding for the
discovery and relief in the same suit and withdrew the whole
case from the legal forum and brought it for decision before a
court of equity, the discovery being merely incidental to the
relief sought.
The same principles governed discovery under oath whether
it was invoked in aid of issues involved in an equity suit or in
aid of issues involved in an action at law.
4 Revised Statutes of 1852, Volume 2, page 27.
5 Acts 1881, page 240; Burns 1926, Sec. 256 et seq. The act was entitled
"An Act Concerning Proceedings in Civil Cases".
DISCOVERY BY INTERROGATORIES
In decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court preceding the
adoption of the present constitution the rules governing the
remedial process of discovery under oath were recognized and
applied.
The defendant in his answer to a bill of discovery was re-
quired to set forth his defense to each claim asserted in the bill,
omitting mere statements of evidence and avoiding general
denials, but specifically admitting, denying or explaining the
facts. The answer was required to be sworn to, unless answer
under oath was waived, and when sworn to constituted not only
an admission as to the facts stated in the answer, but evidence
against the plaintiff. An answer in chancery was to be taken
as true, unless disproved by two witnesses or by one witness and
corroborating circumstances.(
As heretofore stated, section 294 of the code of civil procedure
of 1852 provided that no action to obtain discovery under oath,
in aid of the prosecution or defense of another action, shall be
allowed, except in the manner prescribed by that chapter.
The General Assembly, by the act of 1852, expressly abolished
the remedial process of equity jurisprudence known as a bill
of discovery under oath in aid of an action at law or a suit in
equity or the defense thereof, except as such process was regu-
lated by that act. That remedial process of equity jurisprudence
was not completely abolished, but was abolished only to the
extent that a substituted procedure was prescribed by that act.
The substituted procedure for discovery prescribed by that act
consisted of the following:
(1) Production and inspection of writings.
(2) Examination of adverse parties.
(3) Interrogatories to be filed with the pleadings.
The civil code of procedure of 1881 substantially re-enacted
the provisions of the 1852 code as to the remedies for discovery.
It is thus apparent that our statutory remedies for discovery
are merely regulations of the remedial process of equity for
discovery. In an opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court at the
May Term, 1855, it appears that the defendant filed an insuffi-
cient answer to the complaint and with his answer propounded
certain interrogatories, to which interrogatories the plaintiff
excepted on the ground that the answer was insufficient as a
6 Green v. Vardimaa, 2 Blkf. 324; McCormick v. Malin, 5 Blkf. 509;
Barbee v. Inman, 5 Blkf. 439; Pierce v. Gates, 7 Blkf. 162; Williams v.
Wann, 8 Blkf. 477; Tomlinson v. Lindley, 2 Ind. 569.
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matter of law. The trial court sustained the exception to the
interrogatories and the Supreme Court said :7
"From what has been said it follows that the defendant had no right
to the discovery sought by his interrogatories."
Furthermore, our statutory remedies for discovery are not
only merely regulations of the remedial process of equity for
discovery, but the remedial process of equity for discovery is
in full force and effect except as regulated by the statutes.
Equity jurisprudence in its fullness is in force in the State
of Indiana except as curtailed by the constitution and statutes.
The statute in reference to the joinder of causes of action
merely affects procedure, combines common law and equity prac-
tice and authorizes forms of action that previously were not
maintainable in the separate courts. It does not purport to cut
off any primary or remedial rights in equity then existing. The
intendment is that the legislature did nothing in derogation
thereof.8
In an application for a temporary injunction the plaintiff is
entitled to a discovery from the defendant upon setting out the
facts upon information and belief, and if the defendant after
opportunity given fails to deny the same the court may grant the
injunction. 9
The proceedings created by the statutes governing the recount
of ballots and voting machines is not an independent judicial
proceeding, but is a special proceeding for the discovery of evi-
dence in aid of one who desires to contest with another the title
to an office. 10
Again, Section 802 of the act of 1852 provided that the laws
and usages of this state relative to pleadings and practice in
civil actions and proceedings, not inconsistent therewith and as
far as the same operated in aid thereof or to supply any omitted
case, were continued in force. By virtue of that section the
laws and usages relative to discovery under oath, not incon-
sistent with the code and as far as the same operated in aid
thereof or to supply any omitted case, were continued in force.
The fact that the laws and usages relative to discovery under
7Lamson v. Falls, 6 Ind. 309, 312.
8 Wild v. Noblesville, 153 Ind. 5, 8; Union Trust v. Curtis, 182 Ind.
61, 68.
9 Spurgeon v. Rhodes, 167 Ind. 1, 8.
10 Jordan v. Peacock, 84 Ind. App. 86, 89.
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oath, not inconsistent with the code and as far as the same
operated in aid thereof or to supply any omitted case, were con-
tinued in force is of the first importance as an aid in determining
the rights of the parties in the matter of interrogatories filed
with pleadings, that being a part of the statutory regulation of
and substitution for the remedial process of equity of discovery
under oath.
The code of civil procedure provides that pleadings sworn to
by either party in any case shall not, on the trial, be deemed
proof of the facts alleged therein, nor require other or greater
proof on the part of the adverse party than those not sworn to,
except as herein or otherwise by law provided." Thus was abol-
ished the old equity rule that an answer under oath has the effect
of proof in favor of the answering party.
The divorce act provides that the defendant shall answer the
petition under oath, if required so to do by the petitioner, but
no decree shall be rendered on default without proof, nor shall
any admissions made in such answer be used as evidence in any
other case against the defendant, nor shall the denial under
oath by the defendant of the facts alleged in the petition
render necessary any other or further proof by the complain-
ant than would have been necessary if such denial had not been
under oath.12
Interrogatories are not proper in a divorce action because of
the statute which permits the party to require the defendant to
answer the petition under oath.'3
The provisions of the civil code abolishing the effect of an
answer under oath, the provisions of the divorce act expressly
retaining the answer under oath, the decision in Barr v. Barr,14
that interrogatories are not proper in a divorce action because
an answer under oath may be required, Sec. 294 of the code
of 1852 abolishing the action to obtain discovery under oath,
except in the manner prescribed by the code, and the statutes
providing for the production and inspection of writings, the
examination of adverse parties and permitting interrogatories
to be filed with pleadings clearly disclose that the remedy of
requiring answers to interrogatories filed with pleadings is the
code substitute for the answer under oath to a bill of discovery.
11 Burns 1926, Sec. 384.
12 Burns 1926, Sec. 1101.
13 Barr v. Bairr, 31 Ind. 240.
14 31 Ind. 240.
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The statute governing interrogatories filed with pleadings
provides that the interrogatories shall be filed with the pleadings,
but the statute is not so construed, for it is held that interroga-
tories may be filed at any time before the issues are closed or the
right to file pleadings has terminated; and that the code does
not mean to restrict the right to file interrogatories to the time
of filing any specific pleading.15 However, until a defendant
has pleaded he cannot obtain an order that plaintiff answer
interrogatories. 16  interrogatories filed to elicit evidence in
support of a paragraph of an insufficient answer should be
struck out.' 7 Where a plaintiff has no cause of action he has
no right to compel answers to interrogatories. 8
The statute provides that all interrogatories must be answered
positively and without evasion. If an answer is not relevant
or is evasive or contains improper matter, it is subject to a
motion to strike and to require a proper answer, all of which
must precede the trial.
If the interrogatories are not relevant or it is not proper to
answer them for any reason, the party should move the court
to reject them before the trial. Failing to present the question
at the proper time and answering the interrogatories, he can-
not afterwards complain when they are introduced in evidence. 19
The action of the trial court upon a motion to reject interroga-
tories filed with a pleading in the cause is not ground for a new
trial, but must be assigned as a separate error.2 0
On appeal a party can rely only on objections to interroga-
tories made in the trial court.2 ' Where the court erroneously
refuses to require interrogatories to be sufficiently answered
and the party inquired of testifies fully as to the facts at the
trial, the error may be cured.22
The statute provides that the answers to the interrogatories
may be used on the trial or not, at the option of the party
15 Paul v. Baltimore, 33 Ind. App. 157, 170; Sherman v. Hogland, 73
Ind. 472, 474; Reed v. Spayde, 56 Ind. 394.
16 Wheeler v. Reitz, 92 Ind. 379, 380.
17 Lamson v. Falls, 6 Ind. 309; Lung v. Sims, 14 Ind. 467.
18 Van Walters v. Board, 132 Ind. 567, 572.
19 Combs v. Union, 146 Ind. 688, 693; Cincinnati v. Howard, 124 Ind.
280, 283.
20 Reed v. Spayde, 56 Ind. 394; Cates v. Thayer, 93 Ind. 156.
21 Baltimore v. Berdon, 195 Ind. 265, 276.
2 2 Alesworth v. Brown, 31 Ind. 270; Smith v. McDonald, 3 Ind. App.
49, 50.
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requiring it.23 But the answer to an interrogatory is not bind-
ing on the party who propounds the interrogatory and he may
introduce the answer and then contradict it by other evidence.24
The statute provides that the answering party may set forth
in his answers all relevant matter in avoidance, but an admis-
sion in the answer to an interrogatory is not conclusive against
the party making it and he may contradict it by other evidence. 25
A party is not required in answering interrogatories to con-
fine himself to a simple and unexplained negative or affirmative
response to the question, but he may give such explanation as is
necessary to a full and fair understanding of the matter.26
A party cannot be required to answer an interrogatory the
answer to which will incriminate him.27
The statute provides that all interrogatories must be answered
-within the time limited, positively and without evasion, and the
court may enforce the answer by attachment or otherwise.
Another statute,28 provides that the court shall compel the
parties to file their respective pleadings and answers to interrog-
atories at such time as the court shall deem just, in no case
allowing unreasonable delay. Another section, 29 provides that
if from any cause either party shall fail to plead or make up
issues within the time prescribed the court shall forthwith enter
judgment as upon default, unless for good cause shown further
time be given for pleading. Under those statutes, where a party
fails to comply with the order of court directing him to file
answers to interrogatories, the court has authority to strike
out his pleadings and enter judgment against him as by
default.30
The code,3 1 provides that an answer or other pleading shall
be rejected as sham, either when it plainly appears upon the
face thereof to be false in fact and intended merely for delay
or when shown to be so by the answers of the party to special
233 Answers to interrogatories may be used as evidence at the trial:
Baltimore v. Berdon, 195 Ind. 265, 272.
24 Cracker v..Agenbroad, 122 Ind. 585, 587.
2 5 National v. Elliott, 60 Ind. App. 112, 116.
26 Railsback v. Koons, 18 Ind. 274.
27 French v. Venneman, 14 Ind. 282.
28 Burns 1926, Sec. 428.
29 Burns 1926, Sec. 429.
30 Houser v. Laughlin, 55 Ind. App. 563, 573.
31 Burns 1926, Sec. 409.
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written interrogatories propounded to him to ascertain whether
the pleading is false.
Interrogatories may be propounded with a purpose to elicit
answers on which to strike out a pleading of the opposite party
as sham.82
Where answers to interrogatories support every material
allegation of the complaint the court may strike out an answer of
general denial and render judgment on the interrogatories. 33
The statute provides that corporations, through their proper
officers or agents, shall be required to answer interrogatories as
natural persons. Where interrogatories are addressed to a cor-
poration, it may select and it is its duty to select, in answering
the interrogatories, an agent who is familiar with the facts. 34
It is not a sufficient reason for a corporation to refuse to
answer a cross bill against it for discovery that its officers and
employees are made competent witnesses for either party by
the federal statutes, such testimony not being the exact equiva-
lent of a discovery by the corporation itself.35
The statute provides that the interrogatories shall be relevant
to the matter in controversy. Interrogatories filed with plead-
ings are permitted to enable a party to better prepare his case
for trial or adapt his pleadings to the facts of the case.36 Inter-
rogatories may be propounded with a purpose to use the answers
on the trial of the matter in controversy to which they relate.
37
Interrogatories must be pertinent to the issues and aid the
inquiring party in adapting his pleadings to the facts in the
case.38 They may be propounded when the matter in contro-
versy is presented by an answer in abatement. 39
32 Paul v. Baltimore, 33 Ind. App. 157, 170; Tilden v. Louisville, 157
Ind. 532, 533; Close v. Pittsburgh, 150 Ind. 560; Moyer v. Brand, 102 Ind.
301, 303; Lowe v. Thompson, 86 Ind. 503, 506; Hollander v. Fletcher, 62
Ind. App. 149, 152; Pittsburgh Ry. v. Fraze, 150 Ind. 576, 578.
33 Jones v. State, ex rel., (Ind.) 163 N. E. 260, 262.
34 Cleveland Ry. v. Miller, 165 Ind. 381, 384; Louisville Ry. v. Henly,
88 Ind. 535, 540.
35 Indianapolis Gas Co. v. Indianapolis, 90 Fed. 196; Continental Bank
v. Heilman, 66 Fed. 184.
36 Meyer v. Manhattan, 144 Ind. 439, 445.
37 Paul v. Baltimore, 33 Ind. App. 157, 170; Combs v. Union, 146 Ind.
688, 693; Tilden v. Louisville, 157 Ind. 532.
38 Eickmeier v. Geddes, 73 Ind. App. 167, 170.
39 Paul v. Baltimore, 33 Ind. App. 157, 170; Combs v. Union, 146 Ind.
688, 692.
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It is not error to strike interrogatories that are irrelevant or
concern matters about which there is no dispute.40 A party
interrogated can not be required to state conclusions of law,
answer hypothetical questions, determine the law upon facts
stated or set forth copies of instruments.4 1
Answers to interrogatories are admissions of the party under
oath and the rule that parol evidence is not admissible to prove
the contents of documents and other writings or other facts
shown by the decree of a court or other public record does not
apply in all its strictness to the admissions of a party. Such
admissions are received as primary evidence. 42
The remedies of discovery provided by the statutes of Indiana
are not available in an action at law or a suit in equity in the
federal courts of Indiana. Equity practice in the federal courts
is governed by the equity rules adopted by the United States
Supreme Court and the Indiana statutes regulating discovery
are not available in an equity suit in the federal courts. The
federal conformity statutes providing that the practice in actions
at law in the federal courts shall conform to the practice in
actions at law in the state courts are construed as not adopting
the state statutes regulating discovery.43
Equity Rule 58 of the United States Supreme Court provides
that either party to a suit in equity in the federal courts may
file interrogatories in writing for the discovery by the opposite
party of facts and documents material to the support or defense
of the cause. The decisions of the Federal courts construing
that rule are of assistance in determining the rights of the
parties under the Indiana statute governing interrogatories filed
with pleadings, for Equity Rule No. 58 and the Indiana statute
are very similar, except that the discovery of documents in the
Indiana practice is regulated by another section of the civil code.
In the recent case of Taylor v. Ford Motor Co.,44 the court stated
some of the rules applicable in the construction of Equity
Rule No. 58.
The plaintiff will not be required to discover the particulars
of his own cause of action, where such particulars do not relate
40 Stevens v. Flannagan, 131 Ind. 122, 130.
41 Meyer v. Manhattan, 144 Ind. 439, 445; Baltimore v. Berdon, 195 Ind.
265, 276.
42 Combs v. Union, 146 Ind. 688, 693.
43 Tabor v. Indianapolis Journal, 66 Fed. 423, 424.
44 2 Fed. (2d) 473, 477.
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to any pleaded defense. Nor will the defendant be compelled to
disclose facts material only to his defense. Neither plaintiff
nor defendant is entitled to discovery of an inquisitorial char-
acter as to the ground of action or defense of the other. The
right of discovery as to matters material to the cause of action
or defense of the interrogating party will not be defeated by
the fact that such matters also involve the ground of the defense
or action of the interrogated party. The disclosure of ultimate
facts only can be required. To the extent that discovery may
be granted as to material matters of fact, it must be limited
to inquiry as to the material facts and does not extend to a dis-
closure of evidence or of facts which merely tend to prove the
material facts. The right does not extend to the discovery of
the manner in which, or the evidence by which, the case of
plaintiff or defendant is to be established. Discovery of the
names of witnesses by whom the adversary proposes to prove
his case will not be compelled. A party cannot be compelled to
discover facts of which the other party had equal knowledge, or
equal means of -knowledge. An interrogatory filed under the
rule should embrace a single question, and should be so framed
that it may be clearly seen what the interrogated party is called
upon to answer.
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